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THE UTOPIAN PILGRIMAGE OF MR. JUSTICE MURPHY
JOHN P. ROCHE*

On July 19, 1949, Frank Murphy, Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States died in Detroit. The liberal press mourned
the passing of a mighty warrior for civil liberty. Other journals observed the protocol of the occasion by politely deploring his death, the
University of Michigan Law School prepared a memorial issue of the
Michigan Law Review' in honor of its distinguished alumnus, a few
encomiums appeared in the law journals, 2 then silence set in. A silence
which has been broken only by occasional slighting references to
Murphy's talents, and by a word-of-mouth tradition in law school
circles that the Justice was a legal illiterate, a New Deal political
hack who approached the sacred arcana of the Law with a disrespect
that verged on blasphemy, who looked upon hallowed juridical traditions as a drunk views a lamppost: as a means of support rather than
a source of light.
Murphy was indeed a strange phenomenon and, given the political
developments of the past generation, it seems probable that we shall
not see his likes again. An Irish-American, Roman Catholic, Frank
Murphy was also a militant, dedicated liberal. Probably one of the
best-hated figures of the New Deal period for his uncompromising
refusal to employ martial law against the sit-down strikers, he also
collected enemies among the followers of President Roosevelt for his
unswerving defense of civil liberties against even the "enlightened"
administration. In addition, because of his thoroughly instrumental
approach to law and to legal traditions, he incurred the enmity of all
legal scholars in the apostolic succession from Justice Felix Frankfurter. An ideological, even ritualistic liberal, he brought upon himself
the scorn of the tough-minded "realists" such as Justice Robert Jackson. While Jackson fulfilled Holmes' dictum that a judge must have in
him something of Mephistopheles-in fact, sometimes making Holmes
himself, by comparison, appear angelic-Murphy lacked this quality
completely. In a real sense, I suggest, Justice Frank Murphy was a
utopian pilgrim in this vale of tears, a man with a deep-rooted, religious commitment to the building of a new society in which men would
be both free and prosperous. Thus when Murphy died, the Court lost
more than its leading civil libertarian; it lost a Justice who was the
living incarnation of the militant liberal myth of the New Deal.
* Chairman, Department of Politics, Brandeis University.
1. 48 Mic. L. REV. 737-810 (1950).
2. Ibid. See also Frank, Justice Murphy: The Goals Attempted, 59 YALE L.J. 1

(1949); Gressman, Mr. Justice Murphy: A Preliminary Appraisal, 50 COLUM.
L. REV. 29 (1950); Comment, Mr. Justice Murphy, 63 HARv. L. REV. 289 (1949).
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I
The criticisms of Justice Murphy are themselves interesting for the
light they throw on his symbolic stature. The mildest critics, such as
Herman Pritchett, suggest that the Justice's "hyperactive concern for
individual rights" led him "into ventures little short of quixotic. '3 This
is gentle, indeed, when compared with the strictures of Philip Kurland.
Comparing Murphy to Chief Justice Vinson, Kurland observed:
Neither had any great intellectual capacity. Both were absolutely dependent upon their law clerks for the production of their opinions. Both
were very much concerned with their place in history, though neither
had any feeling for the history of the Court as an institution.... Neither
dealt with the cases presented as complex problems: for each there
was one issue which forced decision. Each felt a very special loyalty to
the President who had appointed him.4
Chief Justice Stone apparently shared this view. From Alpheus
Mason's recent biography of the Chief Justice we learn that Stone
considered Murphy, along with Rutledge, a "weak sister." Consequently Stone refused to give Murphy important decisions:
"The job of the Court," [Stone] said of one of [Murphy's] opinions "is
to resolve doubts, not create them." The Chief Justice was well aware
that he slighted Murphy; he often agreed to give him a "break," but in
the end Murphy would be nosed out partly because Stone disliked leaving
a fine case to the rumination of a law clerk. 5
The essential difference between Murphy's judicial attitude and
that of his more conservative brethren was brought out in 1944 by an
exchange of compliments between Murphy and Roberts. Writing for
the Court in Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local 123,6
the Justice observed in passing:
Such an issue [portal to portal pay] can be resolved only by discarding
formalities and adopting a realistic attitude, recognizing that we are dealing with human beings and with a statute that is intended to secure to
7
them the fruits of their toil and exertion.
Dissenting, Mr. Justice Roberts crystallized in the following terms his
opposition to Murphy's approach:
The question for decision in this case should be approached not on the
basis of any broad humanitarian prepossessions we may all entertain, not
3. PRITCHETT, THE RoosEVELT COURT 285 (1948).
4. Kurland, Review of Pritchett, Civil Liberties and the Vinson Court, 22 U
CHI. L. R-v. 297, 299 (1954).
5. MAsoN, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 793 (1956).
6. 321 U.S. 590 (1944).
7. Id. at 592.
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with desire to construe legislation so as to accomplish what we deem

worthy objects, but in the traditional and, if we are to have a government
of laws, the essential attitude of ascertaining what Congress has enacted
rather than what we wish it had enacted. 8

We shall subsequently examine Murphy's judicial attitude and technique in detail; suffice it here to note the standard counts of the indictment that has been drawn up against him and examine it briefly.
Murphy, it is alleged, was a New Deal politician disguised as a Justice

of the Court, and not a very bright politician at that. He was legally
a creature of his law clerks, excessively loyal to President Roosevelt,
simplistic in his approach to complex legal problems, and bereft of any
historical appreciation of the role of the Supreme Court.
Now, as will appear later, I do not look upon my function in this
essay as one of glorification, or even rehabilitation-I come neither to
praise nor to bury. However, I do feel compelled to demur at the outset to the terms of this indictment. In the first place, since the days
when John Marshall filled the office of Secretary of State in the morning and Chief Justice of the United States in the afternoon, we have
had a high incidence of politicians concealed beneath the judicial robes
of the high Court. Indeed, I have suggested elsewhere 9 that, given the
policy functions of the Supreme Court, this is both inevitable and wise:
to paraphrase Clemanceau, the meaning of the Constitution is far too

important to be left in the hands of legal experts. Thus the complaint
against Murphy, to stand up, must be reformulated to assert that he
was a "bad" political justice, and this accusation must rest upon more
than a subjective dislike of the politics with which he suffused his
opinions. This charge must, in other words, rest upon some empirical
evidence that his decisions were technically incompetent, and none of
his critics have appeared with any documentation of this point, or
even with any criteria by which an evaluation can be made.
So here the argument shifts: Enter the ubiquitous law clerks who
seemingly saved Murphy from his stupidity. Without the kind of information which could supply substance to this accusation one way or
the other, I can enter no judgment on the merits as to Murphy's legal
knowledge and intelligence. However, I suggest that the law clerk
gambit is one best left unexplored, since who can tell how many
judicial reputations may be destroyed by candid revelation of what

occurs in the chambers? Justice Frankfurter seems to have implied to
Professor Mason that Chief Justice Stone's dissent in the Gobitis case10
was a consequence of fervant advocacy of the Jehovah's Witness posi8. Id. at 606.
9. See Roche, Plessy v. Ferguson: Requiescat in Pace?, 99 U. PA. L. REV.
44,52 (1954).
10. Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 601 (1940).
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tion by his clerk, Alison Dunham." Elsewhere in the biography of the
Chief Justice it appears that his famous footnote 4 in the Carolene
Products case was the handiwork of his clerk, Louis Lusky 2 as was
the rationale of the Gerhardtcase. 13 Obviously we are here in dangerous territory. Yet in a fundamental casting up of accounts, is this law
clerk proposition relevant? Why should a Justice not have the right
to assimilate the talents of his apprentices? And, if he takes on brilliant young men and gives them leeway, is it not evidence of his own
14
judgment and intellectual capacity?
The other points in the indictment seem to rest on equally flimsy
factual assumptions. The charge that Murphy was overly loyal to
President Roosevelt flies in the face of the facts: what Justice asserted
more vigorously the rights of the individual, even of individuals who
happened to be Nazis, Communists, or Japanese generals, against the
executive arm of the government? A reading of Murphy's flaming
dissent in Korematsu v. United States,15 which could have been designated more accurately Korematsu v. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Commander-in-Chief, should demonstrate the patent inaccuracy of this
accusation. Undoubtedly Murphy was simplistic in his approach to
legal problems, but, as a reading of John Marshall's disposition of
Virginia's case against the Cohen brothers should suggest, 6 this alone
does not constitute high treason against the traditions of the Court.
To conclude this evaluation of the criticism of Murphy, I would submit that a directed verdict of not proven, if we may borrow it from
the Scottish jurisdiction, is in order. The nub of the case against Frank
Murphy appears to be the content of his opinions, rather than their
form. That is, he was simplistic and untraditional to the "wrong"
ends. In fact, I believe it was Murphy's symbolic stature rather than
his personal qualities that has drawn the attacks, and it is to his
symbolic function that we now turn.
II
To understand Justice Murphy's symbolic role, it is necessary to
examine briefly the New Deal tradition from which he sprung. The
New Deal was a many-faceted phenomenon and, above all, a source of
myths. Indeed, the reality-which was the masterful expediency of
Franklin D. Roosevelt moving now this way, now that, in the effort to
11. Interview cited in MASON, op. cit. supranote 5, at 528.
12. Id. at 513.
13. Id. at 505.
14. Murphy had only three clerks in eight years; John H. Pickering, 1941-43;
Eugene Gressman, 1943-48; T.L. Tolan, Jr., 1948-49.
15. 323 U.S. 214, 233 (1944).
16. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). In Henry Adams'

phrase, to him Marshall was "the despair of bench and bar for the unswerving
certainty of his legal method." I THE FORMATIVE YEARS 104 (Agar ed. 1948).
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deal with immediate problems" 7-has long since vanished beneath
layers of myth. To American conservatives, using this elusive term
in its immediate political sense, the New Deal appeared as a wave of
collectivism that, unless checked, would end by destroying American
freedom. To hopeful liberals, the New Deal seemed to present a magnificant opportunity to remedy the economic and social defects which
were brought into sharp focus by the depression, and armed with an
essentially pragmatic philosophy of life, these worthies descended
upon Washington and set to work in piece-meal fashion ameliorating
the abuses they found. On the far left could be discerned small colonies
of radical sectarians to whom the New Deal represented "incipient
fascism" and "bureaucratic collectivism."
But still another mythical interpretation of the New Deal can be
extracted from the public opinion of the thirties, and it is this viewpoint that is of particular concern here. For lack of a better term, I
shall designate it the militant liberal view of the New Deal. While no
specific group can be found that advanced this position in any organized fashion, it was very important nonetheless. To the militant liberal,
the New Deal had an essentially millennial function: it must revolutionize American life by creating under government auspices and protection both an economy of abundance and an atmosphere of maximum
personal freedom. Many militant - liberals were close to socialism,
though repelled by the Marxist logic-chopping and sectarian feuds
that were characteristic of the left-wing organizations. They were also
close to the pragmatic liberals in terms of the goals to be achieved,
though they differed from the latter with respect to the efficacy of
pragmatic, non-ideological measures of reform. In the fundamental
sense, this was a temperamental difference; while the pragmatic
liberals stuck close to the ground, making inch by inch inroads into
economic and social problems, the militant liberals designed a fullblown American utopia and urged that progress towards it move at
full speed.
This unorganized, amorphous groupement, to borrow an appropriate
term from French politics where such phenomena are plentiful,, had
little practical impact on the Roosevelt administration. Indeed, many
of its constituents detested the anti-ideological sphinx in the White
House. Yet, the net impact of its message, particularly since such influential journals as The Nation and The New Republic reflected its
attitude, was considerable, particularly among young people and in
liberal circles abroad. In short, these were "true believers" who, rejecting insignificant left-wing factions, placed their dream of .the
future in the hands of Franklin D. Roosevelt and, perhaps in the hope
17. For a superb analysis of Roosevelt and the New Deal, see BuRNs, RoOsE-

VELT: THE LION AND THE Fox (1956).
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that their attitude would become a self-fulfilling prophecy, propagandized the message that Roosevelt could be the liberal Messiah. While
Roosevelt made few practical, as distinguished from rhetorical, concessions to this point of view, an outstanding instance of his "fencemending" on the left was the New Deal career of Frank Murphy.
:Since the inner life of Justice Murphy is not our concern here,
biographical facts can be kept to the minimum. After a varied career
at law and in the army during World War I, Murphy was in 1923
elected a judge of the Recorder's Court in Detroit. He was then thirtythree years old. On the bench, he made a name for himself as a pioneer
in the assimilation of psychiatric skills into criminal proceedings,
operating on the assumption, stated a generation later in his dissent
in Fisher v. United States, 8 that "only by integrating scientific advancements with our ideals of justice can law remain a part of the
living fiber of our civilization." His work as the judge in a celebrated
race trial-the Sweet case which saw Clarence Darrow defending
Negroes against a murder indictment growing out of racial hostilitybrought high praise on all sides for his impartiality and immunity to
criticism. Re-elected to the court in 1929, he resigned in 1930 to make a
successful campaign for the office of Mayor of Detroit.
As Mayor of a city ravaged by the depression, he established a nation-wide reputation among liberals for his statement that "not one
deserving man or woman shall go hungry in Detroit because of circumstances beyond his control," thus asserting the responsibility of
go,(ernment for the economic welfare of the people. After a second
term as Mayor, he was in 1933 appointed by President Roosevelt to be
Governor General of the Philippines and, in effect, leader of the movement'for Philippine independence. After the Commonwealth was established in 1935, Murphy remained in Manila as United States High
Commissioner. Evidence that a decade later he still felt himself in loco
parentis to the Philippine people is revealed in his separate opinion in
a case in 1945, urging that American tax laws should be construed in
such a fashion as to help the struggling Islands achieve maturity and
economic strength. 19
In 1936, Murphy returned to Michigan to win the gubernatorial election and assumed office in 1937 to find himself confronted by the famous sit-down strikes. It was his conduct at this time which really endeared the Governor to the militant liberals, for, instead of declaring
martial law, calling out the national guard, and forcibly driving the
workers from the factories, Murphy made every effort to avoid a violent solution and entered into negotiations with union leaders instead
18. 328 U.S. 463, 494 (1946).
19. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945).
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of jailing them. 19a While we can now view the sit-down strikes with a
certain detachment, realizing that since the workers were not prepared
to launch a proletarian revolution, they would eventually get bored
and go home, the conservative view of Murphy's conduct was that he
was encouraging the formation of soviets. The fact that his solution
worked was of course even more galling, and Governor Frank Murphy
became Public Enemy No. 1 in business circles. In 1938, he was defeated for re-election and was immediately appointed United States
Attorney General by President Roosevelt.
Apparently Murphy handled the usual functions of this job with
competence, but his ideological convictions were not dulled by high
office: within a month after he took office, on February 3, 1939, to be
precise, he established a "Civil Liberties Unit" in the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. In announcing his intention of establishing this Unit, Murphy said that "where there is social unrestas I know from having been through no little of it myself since 1930we ought to be more anxious and vigorous in protecting the civil
liberties of protesting and insecure people. '20 When the new section
was set up, the Attorney General justified it in the following terms:
In a democracy, an important function of the law enforcement branch
of government is the aggressiveprotection of fundamental rights inherent
in a free people.
In America these guarantees are contained in express provisions of the
Constitution and in acts of Congress. It is the purpose of the Department
of Justice to pursue a program of vigilant action in the prosecution of
infringement of these.21 (Emphasis added.)
In January, 1940, Attorney General Murphy was appointed to the
Supreme Court to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Pierce Butler.
Like Butler, he was a middle-western Catholic, but there the resemblance ceased. In a statement made on his appointment to the Court,
Murphy emphasized the need for vigorous protection of personal
liberties and added that. . . "those in government-preoccupied with
grave social and economic problems-tend naturally to be less sensitive to instances of oppression and denial of constitutional rights. In
this welter of confusing factors that principle which is the essence of
democracy-tolerance for all sides in all questions-is the loser."22 Two
aspects of this statement are noteworthy: first, Murphy stated clearly
his objection to governmental infringements of personal rights; and,
second, his only reference is to "social and economic" problems, though
19a. Governor Murphy was apparently quite close to the Catholic worker
movement which was, and is, strongly pro-labor.
20. Cited by CARE, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVI RIGHTS 25 (1947).
21. Cited, id. at 1.
22. Cited, id. at 26 n.37.
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war had recently broken out in Europe. Perhapi one reason that
President Roosevelt elevated Murphy to the Court was his intuition
that while Murphy was a fine intern for "Dr. New Deal," he would
have.been a first-rate nuisance to "Dr. Win-the-War."
So did Justice Murphy, on the eve of his assumption of judicial
office, lay down the gage of battle to all those who would infringe on
the liberties of the citizen. And this Justice was to prove himself unique among the New Deal justices in his sensitivity to injustice. His
uniqueness in this regard, I suggest, can be understood by the fact
that alone among the Roosevelt appointees to the high Court, Murphy
was a militant liberal by backgr6und and conviction. Every judge is
dominated by a telos, by a built-in pfirpose that suffuses his assumptions about law, so in asserting that he was teleological we cannot
distinguish him from Black, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, Jackson, or
Rutledge. Where he differed from his New Deal brethren was in the
content of his telos. True, his views overlapped theirs at many points,
but there is nonetheless a discrete corpus of ideals which supplied
Frank Murphy with his bearings, his conviction, and his utter ruthlessness when confronted by procedural niceties that seemingly
masked substantive evils.
I am not asserting that Frank Murphy was a "great" judge; my
analysis and evaluation is directed to a different level where this question is irrelevant. I am concerned with Murphy's symbolic position,
both in the minds of his enemies and those of his friends, and my contention' is that he was the judicial incarnation of the militant liberal
myth of the New Deal, of the body of aspirations which the militant
liberals hoped the New Deal would incorporate into American life. Let
us examine briefly the components of this myth. 23 A rough summary
might read as follows:
First, the militant liberals were dedicated exponents of the rights
of minorities, automatic defenders of the persecuted without regard to
the opinions which brought down the wrath of the majority.
Second, in their approach to business, the militant liberals were
sentimental populists-opponents of "bigness," of trusts, of power concentrations of any sort. This was combined with sympathy for the
small farmer, particularly the farmer-debtor in the squeeze of the
23. For a good discussion of the various strands of New Deal liberalism, see

GOLDMAN, RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY (rev. ed. 1956). The treatment of Roosevelt's relations with the left of HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION

331, (1948) is very insightful. I should note that much of this composite of the
militant liberal I have gained from intensive reading of the liberal and radical literature of the 30's and 40's in connection with a Fund for the Republic
project. The files of The Nation and The New Republic are indispensable,
and for a somewhat more jaundiced view of the New Deal that yet remains
within the militant liberal tradition, Common Sense is most revealing.
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capitalist octopus-John Steinbeck's Grapes of Wrath was required
reading.
Third, the militant liberals believed that the federal government
had a positive responsibility to create economic security for all Americans. They supported over all planning rather than pragmatic meliorism.
Fourth, the militant liberals believed firmly in the divine mission of
trade unions, frequently shocking prosaic trade union leaders by the
fervence of their convictions since the latter were generally under the
illusion that they were committed to raising wages, not saving the
world.
Fifth, though usually not pacifists in the normal usage of the word,
the militant liberals were vigorous anti-militarists, asserting that civil
rights were constitutional absolutes which could not be tampered with
even in wartime.
This is, of course, an over-simplification, but it should suffice to
identify Frank Murphy's ideological pedigree and to distinguish him
from the other New Deal Justices. In the course of this comparison,
it should be recalled that I am not denouncing these other Justices or
excommunicating them from the liberal camp. While I would be a
dissembler if I did not admit at the outset that I shared, and still share
to some degree, the militant liberal Weltanschuung, this analysis is
wholly concerned with their deficiencies from Murphy's vantage point.
The inherent wisdom or folly of his philosophy of life is a subject for
separate analysis. The clue to an understanding of Murphy's divergence from his liberal brethren lies, I think, in the hypothesis that,
while by all accounts a man of considerable practical talent, the Justice was quintessentially a pilgrim in this world. A person who, like
the good Christian in the theology of St. Augustine, bears witness in
this civitas to the values of a transcendent utopia in which he spiritually resides. To Murphy, personal liberty in a society which cherishes
man's personality were the necessary preconditions for the achievement of God-given potentialities, and he would lash out with prophetic
fervor against any who frustrated the achievement of this democratic
utopia in the United States. From this angle, law, indeed, all human
institutions, are purely instrumental and traditions maintain their
validity only so long as their substance contributes to the fulfillment of
the democratic telos. Murphy's anti-traditionalism thus itself stemmed
from a tradition traceable through St. Thomas Aquinas to Aristotle
that instruments retain their legitimacy only as long as they fulfill
their proper functions.
Let us now turn to the delineation of this democratic telos as Justice
Murphy set it forth in the United States Reports.
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III
The various components of the militant liberal tradition were set
out above. Retaining the same categories, and adding a few minor
ones to fill out the picture, let us examine the opinions of Justice Murphy.
Rights of Minorities
Someone once observed that if Frank Murphy were ever to be
canonized, it would be by the Jehovah's Witnesses. Though a member
of a faith which has received the full force of Witness vituperation,
Murphy, after the impact of the Gobitis case made itself felt, consistently supported the claims of the sect. From Jones v. Opelika24 in 1942
to Kovacs v. Cooper 5 in 1949, he accepted and endorsed the pleas of the
Witnesses in every case they brought to the high Court. In Prince v.
2 6
Massachusetts,
which was about as marginal as a religious freedom
case can get, he dissented from the opinion of the Court, written by
Rutledge, that the Massachusetts child labor laws legitimately prohibited Jehovah's Witness children from selling literature. He took
this opportunity to express his views on the general problem:
The sidewalk, no less than the cathedral or the evangelist's tent, is a
proper place, under the Constitution, for the orderly worship of God.
No chapter in human history has been so largely written in terms of persecution and intolerance as the one dealing with religious freedom. From
ancient times to the present day, the ingenuity of man has known no
limits in its ability to forge weapons of oppression for use against those
who dare to express or practice unorthodox religious beliefs. And the
Jehovah's Witnesses are living proof of the fact that even in this nation,
conceived as it was in the ideals of freedom, the right to practice religion
27
in unconventional ways is still far from secure.
Other religious minorities uniformly received his support. A religious pacifist barred from the practice of law in Illinois,28 lost his appeal
to the Court with Murphy joining in Black's dissenting opinion. Three
times Murphy gave judicial comfort to the Mormon schismatics who
retained the custom of plural marriage. Once he wrote the opinion of
the Court condemning the employment of the Anti-Kidnapping statute
against these polygamists, 29 and in two cases he was in dissent when
various other legal restraints were invoked against the practice.30
24. 316 U.S. 584, 611 (1942). Murphy here joined the penitential concurring
dissent of Justices Black and Douglas in which the trio apologized for joining the majority in Gobitis. 316 U.S. at 623.
25. 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949).
26. 321 U.S. 158, 171 (1944).

27. Id. at 174-76.
28. In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 573 (1945).
29. Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455 (1946).
30. A state law prohibiting the advocacy, encouragement, etc., of polygamy:
Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 98 (1948); the employment of the Mann Act:
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Racial minorities could count on Justice Murphy to advance their
claims for full equality. One of his best expressions of his philosophy
of law arose from the Court's intricate disposal of Steele v. Louisville
& N.R.R. 3' Concurring with the judgment of the Court, Murphy insisted that the racially restrictive practices of the union local, which
was attempting to utilize government authority to impose upon the
employer conditions discriminatory to Negroes, should have been declared unconstitutional.
The utter disregard for the dignity and the well-being of colored
citizens shown by this record is so pronounced as to demand the invocation of constitutional condemnation. To decide the case and to analyze the
statute solely upon the basis of legal niceties, while remaining mute and
placid as to the obvious and oppressive deprivation of constitutional
guarantees, is to make the judicial function something less that it should
be.... Racism is far too virulent today to permit the slightest refusal, in
the light of a Constitution that abhors it, to expose and condemn it whereever it appears in the course of a statutory interpretation. 32

His dissent in the Screws case 33 was in a similar, though more infuriated vein.
The Japanese aliens in California, who were unable under the immigration statute of that day to become citizens of the United States,
received extended sympathy from Murphy in a lengthy concurrence
in the case of Oyara v. California.34 Technically at issue in the case
was the validity of an amendment to the state's alien land law which
by welding escheat provisions to a broad presumption was designed
to end Japanese evasions of the ban on land ownership. The Court
dealt with the statute on a very narrow basis, interdicting the presumption without touching on the legitimacy of the land law itself,
and Murphy came out fighting. The land law, he asserted, was on its
face unconstitutional as an infringement of the fourteenth amendment: it could only be described as a legislative implementation of
racism, and the Court betrayed its responsibility to the Constitution
when it refused to confront this fact. He filed a similar objection to a
California law forbidding the issuance of fishing licenses to aliens

ineligible for citizenship which was also disposed of by the Court on
other, less ideological, grounds. 35 He consistently defended the claims
of the American Indians. 36
Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 24 (1946). In the latter case, he observed in dissent: "[M]arriage, even when it occurs in a form of which we
disapprove, is not to be compared with prostitution or debauchery ..
329
3.."
U.S. at 26.
31. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 208-09.
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 134 (1945).
332 U.S. 633, 650 (1948).

Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 422 (1948).
See Confederated Bands of Ute Indians v. United States, 330 U.S. 169,
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Murphy did not limit his concern to racial or religious minorities.

Urban voters, discriminated against by an antiquated system of congressional districting, 37 and by the procedures necessary to get a minor
party on the ballot; 38 members of unpopular political minorities such
40
as the quasi-fascist Terminiello 39 and the communist Gerhard Eisler;
aliens subjected to deportation orders seemingly for their political
activities; 41 all these found in Justice Murphy a strong defender. He
was completely undiscriminating; if his opinion holding the communist Schneiderman illegally denaturalized was in part a ritualistically liberal approach to the nature of international communismhe stated at one point that "we should not hold that petitioner is not
attached to the Constitution by reason of his possible belief in the
creation of some form of world union of soviet republics unless we
are willing so to hold with regard to those who believe in Pan-Ameri,,"42he also vigorously
canism, the League of Nations, Union Now ....
asserted the immunity from denaturalization proceedings of admitted
Nazis. 43
One last minority group to which Murphy extended his judicial
support was a thoroughly marginal one indeed-operators of houses
of prostitution caught in the dragnet of the Mann Act. Murphy insisted that the sole purpose of the Mann Act was to eliminate and
punish white slavery; that the Government had no right to stretch
it to convict a genial proprietor who took two of his employees on a
Florida vacation. Writing for the Court, he stated that "the sole pur180 (1947); Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324
U.S. 335, 362 (1945); Mahnomen County v. United States, 319 U.S. 474, 480
(1943); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. United States, 319 U.S. 598, 612 (1943);
Creek Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 629, 641 (1943). In each of these cases
he dissented. In this area, he wrote two opinions of the Court: Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423 (1943); Seminole Nation v.
United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942).
37. Joining Black's dissent in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 566 (1946).
38. Joining Douglas' dissent in MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 287
(1948).
39. Joining Douglas' opinion of the Court in Terminiello v. Chicago, 337
U.S. 1 (1949).
40. Dissenting in Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189. 193 (1949).
41. Concurring opinion in Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 157 (1945). In
general, see this opinion for his views on deportation procedure. He also joined
the dissenting opinions in Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 193 (1948); Ludecke
v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 173 (1948).
42. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 145 (1943). Wendell Willkie was Schneiderman's counsel. This opinion, when circulated among his
brethren for their comments, brought the following rejoinder from an unidentified Justice: "I think it is only fair to state in view of your general
argument that Uncle Joe Stalin is at least a spiritual co-author with Jefferson of the Virginia statute for religious freedom." Cited by Mason, op. cit.,
supra note 5, at 795.
43. Murphy concerred in Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 678
(1944), objecting to Frankfurter's watering down of his Schneiderman rationale; and joined Rutledge's dissent in Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S.
654, 675 (1946), and the latter's concurrence in Klapprott v. United States,
335 U.S. 601, 616 (1949).
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pose of the journey from beginning to end was to provide innocent
recreation and a holiday," 44 and elsewhere he dissented from a decision
in the Caminetti tradition which employed the Mann Act'against
private, non-commercial debauchery. 45 Reading these cases, one gets
the distinct feeling that Murphy was repelled by the employment of
the majestic sanctions of government against these pathetic, wayward
individuals.
No other New Deal Justice approached his record in this area. Without attempting any mathematic computations, certain things are immediately apparent from reading the opinions. Black, for example,
wrote most of the Indian opinions that Murphy dissented from and at
no point did Rutledge join Murphy in these dissents. Of the other
Justices, Rutledge came nearest to equalling Murphy's score.
The Judicial Process
Under this heading, I have grouped those decisions which related
in one way or another to the conduct of the judicial process: fair trial,
search and seizure, confessions, contempt of court, and the like. Here
Murphy's position was forthright, ruthless, and enormously irritating
to those who look upon the procedural aspects of law as meaningful.
As he put it, dissenting in Carterv. Illinois46 from an opinion of Justice
Frankfurter holding that petitioner had not been denied the elements
of due process,
Legal technicalities doubtless afford justification for our pretense of
ignoring plain facts before us, facts upon which a man's very life or liberty
conceivably could depend.... the result certainly does not enhance the
high traditions of the judicial process. 47
In another case, dissenting all alone from an opinion by Justice Black,
Murphy savagely asserted, "The complete travesty of justice revealed
'48
by the record in this case forces me to dissent.
Now the implication of these remarks, and others of a similar genre
scattered throughout his opinions, is clear. It is a self-righteous, even
smug, claim to a higher moral perspective than his brethren. So spoke
Savonerola to the Florentines, and doubtless some of the Justices on
the Court wished on occasion that they could deal with their conspicuously moral brother as Florence dealt with its scorpion.
Two cases bring out the strength and weakness of Murphy's approach to due process of law. First, in 1942, Murphy for the Court held
that one Glasser had been denied a fair trial in federal court because
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369, 375 (1944).
United States v. Beach, 324 U.S. 193, 197 (1945).
329 U.S. 173, 182 (1946).
Id. at 183.
Canizio v. New York, 327 U.S. 82, 87 (1946).
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he had not received adequate protection by counsel. Now Glasser, as
Justice Frankfurter pointed out in a powerful dissent, was a former
United iStates Attorney who should have been well aware of his legal
rights and seen to it that they were asserted. But Murphy acted as
though an ignorant Negro farmhand, or an illiterate youth, denied
counsel, were sufficient precedents for holding an educated and experienced lawyer to be in the same maltreated category. 49 And Murphy
did approach such problems in an absolutist mood, and, one suspects,
with an inarticulate assumption, that petitioner was always in the
right.
Second, in 1947, Murphy for the Court held a Texas judge's contempt
proceedings against a local newspaper to be a violation of the first
amendment. His opinion was a restatement of his concurrence in
Pennekamp v. Florida50 in which he had declared that criticism of the
Courts is a legitimate form of behavior.
[E]ven though the terms be vitriolic, scurrilous or erroneous ...
Judges should be foremost in their vigilance to protect the freedom of
others to rebuke and castigate the bench and in their refusal to be influenced by unfair or misinformed censure. 51
In one of his brilliant opinions, Justice Jackson dissented lock, stock,
and barrel from what he considered Murphy's ritualistic liberalism.
Cutting to the heart of the matter, Jackson asked one of those disconcerting questions for which his opinions were notable: Supposing the
nation's press were controlled by one organization, would we be so
lofty? The Court's opinion, he felt, had completely lost touch with the
coercive potentialities of a monopoly press, particularly upon an
elected judge. 52 Murphy was, however, unimpressed; he never supported a conviction for contempt on appeal, and one has the suspicion
that he could not conceivably have found a situation in which con53
tempt action was justified against a newspaper.
There is no need to go further with chapter and verse citation.
Whether the issue was the legality of a confession, 54 self-incrimination,55 search and seizure,5 6 jury selection5 7 or the right to a writ
49. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
50. 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
51. Id. at 370.
52. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 394 (1947).
53. See his dissents in Fisher v. Pace. 336 U.S. 155, 166 (1949); United
States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 335 (1947).
54. See. e.g., Taylor v. Alabama, 335 U.S. 252 (1948); Lee v. Mississippi,
332 U.S. 742 (1948); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944).
55. See. e.g., Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942);
Goldstein v. United States. 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
56. See, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Trupiano v. United States, 334
U.S. 699 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Harris v.
United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946);
Davis v. United States. 328 U.S. 582 (1946).
57. See, Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497 (1948); Moore v. New York,
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of habeas corpus, 58 Justice Murphy could be counted on to vote for the
aggrieved party. Many Justices joined him at various points, but there
was one additional hobby of Murphy's that got him little companionship from his liberal brethren-his suspicion of certain aspects of
administrative procedure, notably the employment by administrative
officials of the subpoena power. Thus in 1942, he joined Chief Justice
Stone's opinion of the Court in Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland59
limiting the use of subpoenas in administrative investigations. Douglas,
Black, Byrnes and Jackson dissented vigorously.
This decision was not just a sport: the following year Murphy wrote
a dissent, joined by Justice Roberts, objecting to the conference upon
Secretary of Labor Perkins of broad-inquisitorial jurisdiction and the
subpoena weapon. He pointed out to his former Cabinet colleague that
"under the direction of well-meaning but over-zealous officials they
[subpoehas] may at times become instruments of intolerable oppression and injustice." 60 Three years later he returned to the assault
again in a lone dissent, asserting that the subpoena power should be
confined "exclusively to the judiciary."6' 1 One of his new significant
inconsistencies occurred in this area: in Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking
& Lumber Co.,62 in which the Court sustained the authority of the
Price Administrator to delegate his subpoena power to subordinates,
Murphy silently joined the majority.
Related to Murphy's distrust of bureaucratic inquisitors was his
concern about vague statutes and administrative regulations. The Constitution required, as he saw it, that crimes be narrowly defined in
order that the individual could have reasonable security, that he might
have clear advance knowledge of what the law forbids and what it
permits. Thus a vague statute, or the application of an elastic statute
to an individual's action, or the formulation of an ambiguous administrative rule called for judicial intervention. Beginning in 1941, when he
joined Douglas' dissent in the Classic case,63 and continuing with his
dissent in United States v. Dotterweich64 in 1943, there are a series of
opinions which he either wrote or joined to this effect. 65 It should be
333 U.S. 565 (1948); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947); Thiel v. Southern
Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946); Akins v, Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945).
58. See Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948); Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266
(1948); Parker v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 571 (1948); Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561
(1947); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).

59. 315 U.S. 357 (1942).
60. Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501. 510 (1943).
61. Oklahoma Press Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 219 (1946).
62. 331U.S. 111 (1947).
63. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 329 (1941).
64. 320 U.S. 277, 285 (1943).
65. See his dissent in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S.
190, 227 (1943), which will be discussed later in this analysis; his agreement
with Roberts' dissent in California v. United States, 320 U.S. 577, 586 (1944);
his opinion for the Court in Kraus & Bros. Inc. v. United States, 327 U.S. 614
(1946).
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noted that in many cases where a statute or regulation was allegedly
too vague to stand up, notably in connection with the activities of the
National Labor Relations Board, Murphy did not agree. But it seems
significant that he alone of the New Deal Justices persistently reiterated this point over the years.
Freedom of the Pressand Airwaves
Closely connected with his deep dedication to individual freedom
of speech was his special interest in freedom of communication. And
here he really parted company with his New Deal colleagues. It was
probably his dissents in the network cases6 6 and the Associated Press
case67 which motivated John P. Frank's suggestive comment that
Murphy on occasion allowed "activities he opposed [to] hide behind
symbols he cherished." 68 In the network cases, which involved action
by the Federal Communications Commission to eliminate certain
monopolistic characteristics of the National and the Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Murphy wrote a vigorous dissent, joined only by
Roberts, asserting that the FCC had arrogated to itself this power
without congressional authorization. Only Congress, he claimed, could
legitimately undertake such action. Exposing his real motive, he said:
[B]ecause of its vast potentialities as a medium of communication, discussion and propaganda, the character and extent of control that should
be exercised over it [radio] is a matter of deep and vital concern. 69
In 1945, dissenting in the Associated Press case, Murphy returned
the first time that the Sherman Act has
to,this theme. "Today is...
been used as a vehicle for affirmative intervention by the Government
in the realm of dissemination of information. '70 Incidentally, Murphy's
dissent in this case-a separate opinion from the other two dissenters,
Roberts and Stone-did not say that the anti-trust laws could never
be used against the press. What he objected to was the government's
procedure in the case, which was by injunction and summary judgment, and what seemed to him a lowering of the standards of proof
required in an anti-trust case. The evidence, he felt,
falls far short of proving such a program [of restrictive practices] and
hence the decision has grave implications relative to governmental re[S]uch a failure has unusually dangerous
straints on a free press ....
implications when it appears with reference to an alleged violation7 1of
the [Sherman] Act by those who collect and distribute information.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 227 (1943).
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 49 (1945).
Frank, supra note 2, at 3.
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 228 (1943).
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 51. (1945).
Id. at 50, 52.
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Other opinions of his in this area, dealing with the power of courts
to punish newspapers for contempt, have already been discussed above.
Another opinion in this area which he endorsed was Justice Rutledge's
concurrence in United States v. CIO. 72 Here Rutledge and Murphy,
rejecting the course of the Court though sharing in its judgment, insisted that the Taft-Hartley provision forbidding trade unions to support political candidates was unconstitutional on its face.
GovernmentalResponsibility for "The Good Life"
Under this rubric, I have placed those opinions of Justice Murphy in
which he asserted the responsibility of the federal government over
the economic life of the nation, for the fostering of a strong trade union
movement, and for destroying irresponsible private centers of economic power.
The great battles over the meaning of the commerce clause were won
when Murphy arrived on the bench. The main problems that remained
were those of delineating the activities that Congress intended to
regulate and determining the degree to which Congress desired to
preempt the regulation of interstate commerce and eliminate state
regulation. It seems hardly necessary to note that Murphy took an
extremely comprehensive view of the commerce power, 73 though from
1946 on, he tended to affiliate with the "states'-rights" position of
Justices Black and Douglas, i.e., to accept the wide latitude these
Justices were prepared to give to state taxes and regulations affecting
interstate commerce. 74
Murphy's opinions in this area can conveniently be subdivided into
four groups: those which interpret the scope of the commerce power
under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Public Utilities Holding
Company Act; those examining the rights of labor; those dealing With
the operating procedures of administrative agencies; and those adum72. United States v. CIO,335 U.S. 106, 129 (1948).
73. See, e.g., his opinions of the Court in United States v. Yellow Cab Co.,

332 U.S. 218 (1947); United States v. Walsh, 331 U.S. 432 (1947).

74. He also in a sense defended "states'-rights" in the area of divorce. Some
have suggested that this was his Catholic conviction surfacing in a sphere
where the Church holds strong views, but the logic of this contention escapes

me. After all, he was not denying the right of a state to grant a divorce to
bona fide residents, but rather disagreeing with the conditions under which
"full faith and credit" shall be given to a divorce consummated in another
state. In what were probably the most important cases-Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S.
378, 386 (1948); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 365 (1948)-he joined

Justice Frankfurter's learned and masterful dissent. See also his concurring
opinion in Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226. 239 (1945), and his dissent in Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 308 (1942). In another area
where his religion might have been expected to influence his judgment, if anywhere, there is no apparent correlation. In the "church and state" cases, he
rode silently with the majority first one way and then the other. See Illinois
ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Everson v. Board
of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Murphy's religious convictions gave him a
deep set of natural law premises which penetrated every aspect of his legal
thought, but did not result in any immediately "religious" opinions.
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brating the prerogatives of state governments over interstate commerce. Obviously there is some overlap, but if not definitive, this
division is accurate enough for our purposes here.
In a series of opinions, both majority and dissenting, Justice Murphy
gave a broad interpretation of the FLSA.75 One case in particular is
worth singling out-the Jewel Ridge case76 in which Murphy for the
Court overruled the Administrator and held portal to portal travel
time part of the miner's work-week. Justice Jackson, in dissent, denounced the holding as an extreme instance of judicial lawmaking,
one demonstrably against the wishes of Congress. Similarly, Justice
Murphy for the'Court sustained the "death sentence" provisions of the
Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935 when, after lurking for
years in constitutional limbo,77 this provision finally came under judi-

cial appraisal. 78
Murphy's record as a defender of the rights of labor is somewhat
more ambiguous than is often realized. Although he was responsible
for the key decisions in Thornhill v. Alabama 9 and Carlson v. California,80 which held that peaceful picketing was a manifestation of
freedom of speech and thus protected against state infringement by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, Murphy did not
join the dissent of Justices Black, Douglas, and Reed in the Meadowmoor case.8 1 This in spite of the fact that Black went to great pains to
point out in his dissent, perhaps with an eye on Murphy, that the
injunction in the instant case was almost identical in wording with the
statutes held void on their face in the two earlier cases. 82 Moreover,
while he joined Black's dissent in Carpenters & Joiners Union, Local
213 v. Ritter's Cafe,83 alleging that the employment of the Texas anti75. See his opinions of the Court in Borden Co. v. Borella, 325 U.S. 679

(1945); Jewel Ridge Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 161 (1945);
Phillips Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490 (1945); United States v. Rosenwasser, 323
U.S. 360 (1945); Overstreet v. North Shore Corp.. 318 U.S. 125 (1943); WarrenBradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, 317 U.S. 88 (1942). See also his dissents in
10 East 40th Street Building, Inc. v. Callus, 325 U.S. 578, 585 (1945); Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490, 509 (1945); McLeod v. Threlkeld,
319 U.S. 491, 498 (1943). His one rejection of the claims for broad coverage
may have been motivated by his special concern for the press, or by simple
common sense. In 1946. he dissented from the Court's holding that a newspaper
that shipped 45 of 10.000 newspapers into interstate commerce was subject to
coverage under the FLSA. Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S.
178, 185 (1946).
76. Jewel Ridge Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 161 (1945).
77. See, for a discussion of the difficulties involved in getting a judicial
evaluation of the "death sentence" provision of the Public Utilities Holding
Company Act, Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 19331946, Part H, 59 HARv. L. Rav. 883, 940-42 (1946).

78. American Power &Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 (1946); North American

Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686 (1946).

79. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
80. 310 U.S. 106 (1940).

81. Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
82. Id. at 308-09.
83. 315 U.S. 722, 729 (1942).
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trust law against a secondary boycott was a violation of the union's
freedom of speech, and seemed in AFL v. Watson8A to be eager to strike
down the Florida "right to work" law as unconstitutional, he equivocated without opinions when state "right to work" statutes finally
arrived for substantive evaluation.a
However as a defender of the National Labor Relations Board, he
was without peer on the Court. Once it was established to his satisfaction that the Board was operating within its statutory vires, and
providing no civil liberties issue was apparent on the face of the
record,8 6 he felt that the task and proper function of the Court was
done. As he put it in the Phelps-Dodge case, 87 partially dissenting,
Our only office is to determine whether the rule chosen, tested in the light
of statutory standards, was within the permissible range of the Board's
88
discretion.

He followed the same track in discussing the actions of other administrative agencies, notably the Securities and Exchange Commission, 89
and the Federal Power Commission.90 He was never particularly happy
about the price control system, probably because of what he felt to be
certain unconstitutional procedures that were established for handling
violationsP-and perhaps fundamentally because of his allergy to the
84. 327 U.S. 582 (1946).

85. AFL v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1949); Lincoln Federal
Labor Union, AFL v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949).
In the former case, he dissented without opinion; in the two grouped together
under Lincoln Federal Labor Union, AFL v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co.,
supra,he concurred with Rutledge's opinion which accepted the judgment, but
not the rationale, of the Court.
86. This respect for what the British term the "principles of natural justice"
appears clearly in two cases: In 1941, Murphy for the Court remanded to the
NLRB the Virginia Power Co. case for evidence that defendants in encouraging
a company union had not merely been exercising their right of freedom of
speech. NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941). The NLRB
adduced further evidence that coercion beyond mere verbal encouragement
had been involved, and on the basis of the new record, the Court through
Murphy sustained the Board's disestablishment of the company union. Virginia
Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533 (1943). In 1949, he employed the
same technique in NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226 (1949), supporting the Board up to the point where an employer was handed a broad,
vague injunction to desist from frustrating certain union activities. The latter
technique, he maintained, was bad, and the injunction must be reformulated
in specific, equitable terms.
87. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 200 (1941).
88. Id. at 206. See also his dissent for the Board in International Union of
Mine Workers v. Eagle-Picher Mining & Smelting Co.. 325 U.S. 335, 344 (1945),
and his agreement with Reed's dissent in Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S.
31.49 (1942).
89. See his opinions for the Court in SEC v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946),
and American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 325 U.S. 385 (1945); and his agreement with Black's dissent in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943).
90. See his dissent in Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 515,
536 (1945), and his agreement with Black's dissent in FPC v. Natural Gas
Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 599 (1942).
91. Joining the Rutledge dissent in Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414. 448
(1944), in which the two justices asserted that the procedures for handling
violations impaired constitutional liberties.
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war powers and all their legal ramifications which will be discussed
later-but he did join with Douglas in a dissent against a judicial
weakening of the price control mechanism. 92 However, the Interstate
Commerce Commission, often considered in liberal circles as a feudal
vassal of the railroad interests, got little aid and comfort from Murphy.9 3 In the Inland Waterways case, for example, there was no
discussion by the dissenters of the finality of administrative determinations. On the contrary, Justice Black, speaking for Douglas and Murphy, asserted that:
The issue in this case is whether the farmers and shippers of the middle
west can be compelled by the Interstate Commerce Commission and the
railroads to use high-priced rail instead94of low-priced barge transportation for the shipment of grain to the east.
This quotation, though from an opinion by Justice Black, brings
out a characteristic that Murphy shared with that Justice and Douglas,
a quality which I have designated "populism." There is a sentimental
anti-capitalism, or more correctly, a sentimental attachment to a world
of small businessmen and independent farmers, which comes out
clearly in a series of opinions dealing with various aspects of the administrative process. In his concurring opinion in United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp.,95 Murphy, irritated by the profits claimed by
the steel company in some World War I contracts, went out of his way
to declare:
In voting for affirmance of the judgment, I do not wish to be understood
as expressing approval of an arrangement like the one now under review,
by which a company engaged in doing work for the government in time
of grave national peril-or any other time-is entitled to a profit of 22
per cent under contracts involving little or no risk and grossing many
millions of dollars. Such an arrangement not only is incompatible with
sound principles of public management, but is injurious to public confidence and public morale. 96
In this same "populist" tradition, we find him dissenting in behalf of
the farmer-debtor burdened by a "narrow formalistic" interpretation
of section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act,97 and, in particular, advancing an
92. Davis Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144. 156 (1944). But see the
Kraus Bros. case, 327 U.S. 614 (1946), in which he condemned for the Court
the creation of ambiguous offences by the Price Control Administration.
93. See his agreement with Roberts' dissent in California v. United States,
320 U.S. 577 (1944), and his agreement with Black's dissent in ICC v. Inland
Waterways Corp., 319 U.S. 671, 692 (1943).
94. 319 U.S. 671, 692 (1943).
95. 315 U.S. 289, 310 (1942).

96. Ibid.
97. State Bank v. Brown, 317 U.S. 135, 142 (1942). See also his opinion of
the Court in Carter v. Kubler, 320 U.S. 243 (1943).
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anti-monopolistic interpretation of patent rights. 98 As might have been
expected, he joined the Douglas dissent in United States v. Columbia
Steel Co.,99 which is as vigorous and well-reasoned an anti monopoly
tract as any populist could hope for. Perhaps the full flavor of this
viewpoint is best set forth by an excerpt from a dissent by Justice
Black in an enormously intricate case.
Hereafter, [said Black, in view of the interpretation of the full faith and
credit clause expounded by the Court] . . . the state in which the most

powerful corporations are concentrated, or those corporations themselves,
might well be able to pass laws which would govern contracts made by
the people in all of the other states.100 (Ephasis added.)
Murphy joined Black in this opinion, which surely states in its essence
the populist assumptions about the extent of corporate power over
the political process.
In the general area of "states'-rights" over interstate commerce,
Murphy apparently had no strong views of his own. The evidence suggests that he accepted Chief Justice Stone's leadership in this tricky
field until the latter died; then moved over to the Black-Douglas camp.
His one opinion of the Court in this connection dealt with a conflict
between the ICC and the state of California. 101
The Constitutionand the War
While Murphy differed in degree from his New Deal colleagues on
many of the problems we have examined, it was in connection with
the war powers that he demonstrated his uniqueness. While for all
the other Justices, to a greater or lesser degree, the Constitution went
into judicious hibernation during World War II, to Frank Murphy it
stood in its pristine form as a guardian of the rights of the individual
and the ideals of American society.
98. See his position in Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S.
743 (1947); Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S.
637 (1947); Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Co.,
324 U.S. 806 (1945); Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370 (1945); Central
States Elec. Co. v. City of Muscatine, 324 U.S. 138 (1945); Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. RAY-O-VAC Co., 321 U.S. 275, 279 (1944).
99. 334 U.S. 495, 534 (1948).

100. Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 642

(1947).
101. He joined Stone's dissent in Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315
U.S. 148, 177 (1942); Stone's opinion of the Court in Southern Pacific Co. v.

Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Stone's concurrence in New York and Saratoga
Springs Comm'n v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 586 (1946). He only joined
Black and Douglas once before Stone's death, dissenting in Nipper v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 435 (1946). However, from that time on he was generally
with Black and Douglas. See Interstate Oil Pipe-line Co. v. Stone, 337 U.S.
662 (1949); H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Central
Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948). The case in which he

wrote the opinion of the Court sustaining the California motor vehicle regulations was California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949).
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True, he got off to a slow start by disqualifying himself in Ex parte
Quirn,0 2 the case of the nazi saboteurs, presumably because he was
temporarily a Lt. Col. in the Army on active service, 103 and in the
first draft case involving the rights of conscientious objectors, he joined
the majority opinion, sustaining the government, rather than Jackson's
dissent. 104 But from the Hirabayashi case' 05 on, he was a consistent,
even doctrinaire, opponent of the view that the Constitution had gone
to war.
And here he violently parted company with his liberal brethren.
1 06
Black and Douglas, in particular, became vigorous war-hawks,
Jackson retired to a private universe of realpolitik suggesting that
the Court should avoid ruling on nasty wartime problems since it was
bound, given the power situation of the moment, to make bad decisions, 10 7 and even Rutledge, who had stood shoulder to shoulder with
Murphy in many a lost cause, defected. In short, Justice Murphy
found himself isolated on an extreme promontory, standing in lonely,
and perhaps visionary, grandeur, and with the fiery virulence of a
religious prophet, he castigated his friends and erstwhile associates
for their betrayal of the democratic faith. Indeed, one suspects that he
became a bit obsessed about the matter: if he reads carefully the first
two or three hundred pages of volume 327 of the United States Reports,
beginning with the Yamashita case,1 08 he gets the feeling that Murphy has become literally frenzied, striking about him at his colleagues
in all types of cases with the angry passion of a betrayed lover.
We have it on the testimony of his law clerk, Eugene Gressman, that
Murphy almost immediately regretted his concurrence in the Hirabayashi case, 0 9 feeling that the real motive for the detention and
expulsion of the Nisei from the west coast to concentration camps in
the hinterland was not military, but racial. Only hesitantly had he
given his approval to the judgment of the Court, and he insisted on
writing a separate opinion to make clear his reasons. In this he stated:
In voting for the affirmance of this judgment I do not wish to be understood as intimating that the military authorities in time of war are sub102. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
103. MAsoN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 655.
104. Bowles v. United States, 319 U.S. 33, 36 (1943).
105. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
106. See, e.g., their dissents in Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 249
(1943), and Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945); Black's opinions of
the Court in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and Falbo v.
United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1944); Douglas' opinion of the Court in Singer
v. United States, 323 U.S. 338 (1945), for their general approach to the interpretation of war powers.
107. See this amazing dissent in Korematsu v. United States, supra note 106,
at 233, for a full statement of his views.
108. Yamashita v. Styler, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
109. Gressman, supra note 2, at 36.
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ject to no restraints whatsoever, or that they are free to impose any restrictions they may choose on the rights and liberties of individual citizens
or groups of citizens in those places which may be designated as 'inilitary
areas." While this Court sits, it has the inescapable duty of seeing that
the mandates of the Constitution are obeyed. That duty exists in time of
war as well as in time of peace, and in its performance we must not
forget that few indeed have been the invasions upon essential liberties
which have not been accompanied by pleas of urgent necessity advanced
in good faith by responsible men.110
When the plight of the American-Japanese came again to the Court
in 1944, Justice Murphy drew the sword of duty and wrote one of the
imost passionate dissents in the history of the Supreme Court. He
denied utterly that the decision had been founded on military criteria,
and declared flatly that the evacuation and detention-for he refused
to join the sophistry of the Court that these were separate, discrete
actions-fell into "the ugly abyss of racism.""' At the heart of his dissent is the point, ignored by Justice Black's majority opinion, that a
"military judgment" cannot be simply, and circularly, defined as a
judgment by a military officer. Thus the Court, while not having the
right to supersede the Chiefs of Staff as military experts, has the duty
to see that military judgments are in fact founded upon military considerations and not upon views on social policy temporarily in uniform.
With regard to the enforcement of the Selective Service Act, particularly with reference to conscientious objectors, Murphy consistently
insisted that "all of the mobilization and all of the war effort will have
been in vain if, when all is finished, we discover that in the process we
have destroyed the very freedoms for which we fought."" 2 Dissenting
alone from Black's opinion of the Court in Falbo v. United States-a
case involving the rights of conscientious objectors-Murphy uttered
what is probably the clearest and most forceful statement of his telos:
The law knows no finer hour than when it cuts through formal concepts
and transitory emotions to protect unpopular citizens against discrimination and persecution."13

During the War, various sorts of legal action were brought against
Nazi sympathizers and alleged enemy agents. When the convictions
resulting from these actions came before the Supreme Court on appeal,
Murphy without exception voted against affirmation, and was the only
110. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 113 (1943).
111. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 233 (1944).
112. Concurring separately in Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 132 (1946).
See also his dissents in Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 193 (1947), and Cox v.
United States, 332 U.S. 442, 457 (1947); and his agreement with Frankfurter's
dissent in Singer v. United States, 323 U.S. 338, 346 (1945).
113. 320 U.S. 549, 561 (1944).
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Justice with this record. It was his view that, if anything, the existence
of a state of war required an increase in constitutional sensitivity and
114
militantly flung his influence against the passions of the moment.
Probably his most notable effort to view the tumults of the hour
sub specie aeternitatis occurred when counsel for General Yamashita
attempted to obtain a writ of habeas corpus from the high Court, claiming that the military commission established to try Japanese "war
criminals" was unconstitutional and without jurisdiction. The Court
held itself without jurisdiction-at least this seems to be what the
Court held: the opinion is in John P. Frank's words, "sufficiently opaque to defy brief statement" 115 -with Rutledge writing a dissent joined
by Murphy and Murphy writing a separate solitary dissent.1 1 6 Murphy's
dissent was a blistering attack on the whole war crimes procedure in
the Far East as "unworthy of the traditions of our people." 11 Noting
that the real lesson of the trials was Don't Ever Lose a War, he asserted that even the admitted Japanese atrocities "do not justify our
abandonment of our devotion to justice in dealing with a fallen enemy
commander. To conclude otherwise is to admit that the enemy has
lost the battle but has destroyed our ideals." 118
Murphy's anti-militarian was more dogged than fruitful, but it can
be found in a whole series of opinions, the most noteworthy of which
is his lengthy concurring opinion in Duncan v. Kahanamoku 19 reasserting the vitality of David Davis' sonorous holding in Ex Parte Milligan120 that "the Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers
and people, equally in war and peace, and covers with the shield of its
protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances."'' And who but Murphy could have achieved the combination of anti-militarism and populism attained by the following statement?
In my opinion it is of greater importance to the nation at war and to
its military establishment that high standards of public health be maintained than that the military procurement authorities have the benefit of
unrestrained competitive bidding and lower prices in the purchase of
needed milk supplies.122
114. See Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948): Haupt v. United States,
330 U.S. 631 (1947); Keegan v. United States, 325 U.S. 478 (1945); Cramer
v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945); Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680
(1944); Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236 (1943).
115.
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797 (1950).

116. Yamashita v. Styler, 327 U.S. 1, 26 (1946).
117. Id. at 28.
118. Id. at 29.
119. 327 U.S. 304, 324 (1946). See also Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695
(1949); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949); Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S.
197 (1948).
120. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
121. 327 U.S. at 335.
122. Concurring opinion in Penn Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm'n, 318
U.S. 261, 280 (1943).

19571

FRANK MURPHY

In regard to Murphy's attitude towards the war powers, there is
one point that remains for brief treatment: his attitude towards the
limitations on the right of appeal incorporated in the price control
legislation. It will be recalled that an Emergency Court of Appeals was
established to handle cases arising under the statute and elaborate
procedures were set up governing the legal aspects of appeal. When in
1944, the constitutionality of this structure was challenged, Roberts,
Rutledge and Murphy dissented from Stone's holding that it was a
valid exercise of the war powers. 123 That this was not just constitutional windmill tilting is suggested by the fact that the Rutledge dissent, which Murphy joined, has impressed even such a hard-boiled
realist as Edward S. Corwin. 124
This examination of the judicial record of Justice Murphy has, I
suspect, been a tedious trip for the reader. However, it seems important
to get the data on the record before moving on to the final section of
this essay in which I will summarize what seems to me the judicial
essence of Frank Murphy.
IV
It was suggested earlier that Justice Frank Murphy was the judicial
incarnation of the militant liberal myth of the New Deal, and while at
some points, e.g., his view of trade unions, he fell a bit short of the
archetypical aspiration, it is nonetheless true that he fitted the pattern far more closely than did any of his New Deal colleagues on the
Court. While each of the other Justices went part way down the road
with him, each turned off somewhere short of Murphy's destination.
But this still leaves open the persistent question: Was he a "good"
judge? To the extent that this means: Was he a good legal craftsman?,
I would venture the opinion, based both on a careful reading of every
opinion he wrote (including a mass of technical tax opinions which
have not been discussed here: of the 132 opinions he wrote for the
Court in his nine years of service, almost a third were in this category
and they were mostly for a unanimous Court) and disregarding as irrelevant the question of authorship on grounds explained earlier, that
while Justice Murphy surely did not have the technical competence of a
Frankfurter or a Stone, he was certainly not below par for the Court.
The basic proposition that has to be understood in dealing with Murphy, I think, was that he chose not to immerse himself in the mysteries
of the guild.
This choice was based on both temperamental and intellectual reasons: by temperament he was a fighter who was aroused by seeming
injustice and did not want to check the rule book before he went into
123. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 460 (1944).
124. CoRwiN, TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 131 (1947).
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action; by intellect he was an instrumentalist, not in the Deweyan
sense of being a pragmatist, but in the natural law tradition of viewing all the phenomena of the world about us in terms of a higher purpose, as instruments for the fulfillment of the telos. In other words,
Murphy mounted the wild horse of natural law and mercilessly rode
down those institutions, traditions, legal precedents, which stood between him and his destination-a democratic utopia.
Therefore it is perhaps not unfair to his memory to suggest that he
was the McReynolds of the left, though I hasten to add that he did not
share the latter's misanthropic disposition. Like McReynolds, he was
a vigorous, even belligerent, fighter for the things he believed in, nd
like McReynolds, he called a spade a spade. He was also a judicial
activist, who had no time for philosophies of "self-restraint"-except,
of course, when judicial self-restraint contributed to his substantive
goal. But here he is in good company. Even the Court's leading advocate of self-restrai it, Justice Frankfurter, has been known to rise
above principle-a dissent in Brown v. Board of Education would
surely have followed logically from the author of the Gobitis opinion. 125
Yet, given these qualities, there was a quality about Murphy which
made him an asset to the Court. No one, and certainly no student of
constitutional law, would want a Supreme Court composed entirely of
Murphy's-or of Jackson's, or Frankfurter's, for that matter-but is it
not valuable to sprinkle the high tribunal from time to time with men
who, disdaining the tortuous paths of the law, assert in a clarion peal
the basic truth, so often forgotten by those with their nose close to the
earth of precedent, that law is at root an instrument for the achievement of social goals? And that in a democracy, there are no more priceless goals than individual liberty and collective prosperity? If this is
the case, then the utopian pilgrimage of Mr. Justice Murphy was not
made in vain.
125. See my discussion of this point in Roche, Judicial Self-Restraint, 49
Am. POL. Sci. REv. 762 (1955).

